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IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL M. SCHWARTZ, AND BERNICE
L. SCHWARTZ,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

CASE NO.

14832

and

Vs.

CASE NO.

14844

M.D. HALTOM and MICHAEL
S. TANNER,
Defendants-Appellants.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF CASE
Respondents, Daniel

M.

Schwartz and Bernice Schwartz

commenced an action against the Appellants alleging a violation
of the Utah Uniform Securities Act and fraud regarding the sale
of a home by Mr.

and Mrs.

Honorable Ernest F.
Defendants,

Schwartz.

before the

Baldwin,Jr., Judgment was entered against

Stan Tanner, Michael

Appellants, Michael

After a trial

S.

S.

Tanner and M.D.

Tanner and H.D.

Haltom.

Haltom have appealed

from said Judgment.
DISPOSITION
Judgment was
Appellants, Michael
Stan Tanner,

S.

entered

IN LOWER COURT

in favor of Respondents against

Tanner and M.D.

Haltom,

and Defendant,

in the sum of $40,643.00 as damages and $7,500.00

as attorney's fees

based upon Respondents'

fraud,

deceit and

statutory action under the Utah Uniform Securities Act.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants are requesting this Court to reverse the
findings and reverse and vacate the Judgment entered by the
Trial Court and for costs of this action herein incurred. Respondents request that this Court affirm the Trial Court's findings and Judgment and for costs of this action herein incurred.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents, Daniel M. Schwartz and Bernice Schwartz
were the owners of real property located at 1792 Millbrook Road,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which was listed for sale
(T. 14); that pursuant to said offer of sale, Respondent, Daniel
M. Schwartz was contacted by Appellant, M.D. Haltom on December
8, 1968 at the San Francisco Airport (T. 15); that during the
course of said meeting, Appellant, M.D. Haltom made representations of a pending merger of Bishop Industries and United
Equities on a three-to-one or four-to-one ratio,of an acquisition of a 915,000 acre buffalo ranch.of uranium properties,
Scotty Auto Service Center, representations that Jiffy John had
been approved by the Los Angeles Smog Control Board; that there
were 5,000,000 shares of stock which could be purchased at
$3.00 per share; that Western States Capitalization was 540,000
shares at $1.00 per share, and that Mr. Stan Tanner, the princ i pal of r1 r . M. D. Hal tom was wi l l i ng to pl edge shares of said
stock and issue a note so that the property owned by Respondents
could be transferred free and clear of liens (T.18, 21, 22, 23,
24 and 25).

Respondent, Daniel Schwartz was advised by

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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M.D. Haltom that he had first hand knowledge regarding the
representations of the various companies for which stock was
to be placed in escrow to secure a note on the property in
question (T.82 and 83).

That Appellant, M.D. Haltom had on

several occasions represented that the home which was to be
purchased by Stan Tanner for his son, Michael S. Tanner was
to be free and clear of all liens (T.24 and 91).

Respondent

attempted to make an independent check on United Equities' stock
through a stock broker and have a check on Mr. Krueger's
credit, who was reported to have been the President of United
Equities (T.65 and 67).
In reliance upon M.D. Haltom's representations regarding the value of the stock which was to be placed as
security, Respondents decided to go forward with the sale of
the property in question to Stan Tanner (T.45, 53, 54 and 59).
That on January 2; 1969, Stan Tanner personally executed and
delivered to the Respondents a promissory note in the principal
sum of $40,643.00 with interest and the note was secured by a ple~:
of 10,000 shares of common stock of Bishop Industries and 20,000
shares of the common stock of Western States Land.

(Exhibit "5d")

That as additional consideration for the sale of the home in
question, Stan Tanner, on the 2nd day of January, 1969, granted
an option for the purchase of Bishop Industries, Inc. stock
(T.36, Exhibit "4").

That based upon said representations of

M. D. Ha l tom a n d the o pt i o n , a l~ a r r n a t y Deed wa s i s s u e d bY the
Respondents to Appellant, Michael S. Tanner and Louise
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Tanner (T.43, Exhibit "6").
The Appellant, Michael S. Tanner testified that in
November of 1968 he came to Salt Lake City to look for suitable homes for his family and to take a position in his father's
organization (T.166 and 167).
property

He further testified that any

would have to be transferred to him without a mort-

gage (T. 166); that on the 20th day of February, 1969, prior to
the Appellant, Michael S. Tanner moving into the residence in
question, a mortgage was issued to Milne Truck Lines (T.172
and 173, Exhibit "17"), and that the bulk of the proceeds as
the result of said mortgage was tendered to Jenifer Day, a
corporation which was owned by Michael S. Tanner's father and
stepmother, and, Michael S. Tanner had an interest in said corproation at one time (T.162 and 178).

That Michael S. Tanner

lived in the home for a period of approxiamtely one year, at
which time he moved out (T.181).
Defendant, Stan Tanner, defaulted on the payment of
the promissory note in question and Alvin I. Smith, as an escrow
agent, attempted to find a market for the sale of the stock in
question, but was unable to find a market for the stock and
was advised by Appellant,

.iichael S. Tanner, that there was

no market for the stock in question (T. 139 and 142).
The buffalo deal, which was represented as being
placed in escrow by Appellant, M.D. Haltom, on December 8, 1968,
did not materialize (T.207): the merger never occurred, (T.215)
and there was a dispute with the Jiffy. John contract (T.190 and
19 l ) .
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The Trial Court entered Judgment in favor of Respondents, Daniel M. Schwartz and Bern1·ce L · s c hwartz against
Defendants, M.D. Haltom, Stan Tanner and Michael

s. Tanner

$40,643.00 damages and $7,500.00 attorney's fees (R.80).

for

The

Court also awarded damages against Stan Tanner for $21,870.Zg
as interest on the aforementioned note (R.80).
PO INT I
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED BY THE RESPONDENTS IN THE LOWER COURT TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND
JUDGMErH.
Sufficient evidence was presented on a trial of the
issues to establish the liability of Appellants, M.D. Haltom
and Michael S. Tanner.

37 C.J.S., Fraud

§

61 at pp. 347, 348

states:
"However, the circumstances may be such as to impose
liability for representations made by others, as
where parties jointly participate in defrauding
complainant. This is especially true where there
was a conspiracy to defraud, but it is not essent i a 1 to 1 i a b i 1 i t T th a t ___there s ho u 1 d ha v e been s uch
a conspiracy."
emphasis added
The transcript, when viewed favorable to the Respondents, clearly indicates that there \vas a systematic program
of obtaining the property in question without a mortgage lien.
Ho1-1ever, before the Appellant, Michael S. Tanner moved into
the property, the same was mortgaged and the proceeds tendered
to a corporation over which he had previously been associated
and over which his father and stepmother had a controlling
interest (T.166).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Utah Supreme Court indicated in the case of
Greenwell v. Duvall, 9 U.2d 89, 338 P.2d 118 (1959) that clear
and convincing evidence is necessary only where the moving
party is attempting to set aside a written agreement and that
where no written agreement is involved, only a preponderance
ot the

0

vidence is necessary.

The Utah Supreme Court in Lamb

v j)_a_11_g_a__r_t, 526 P.2d 602 (1974), at p. 609 in explaining Child
y-'-_i,Jli__l__d, 8 U. 2d 261, 332 P.Zd 891

(1958) in regard to a fraud

action states:
if the evidence appears to be such that reasonable minds acting fairly.reasonably and in good
conscious could be regarded as clear and convincing
as the ordinary meaning of these words imply, the
findings should not be disturbed. The findings and
Judgment should not be disturbed unless the court
can say affirmatively and with some degree of assurance that there is no reasonable basis in the evidence that could fairly and rationally support the
requisite degree of proof, i.e., by clear and convincing evidence."
The Court, in reviewing the evidence is obligated to
review the evidence in a light most favorable to Respondent's
!'Ost1tion.

The Court, in Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 U.2d

378, 423 P.Zd 659 (1967), at p. 662 states that the Court must:
" ... take the evidence in a light most favorable to
plaintiffs (prevailing party) position, as we are
obligated to do on this review."
This stateMent is supported in Ewell & Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake
l_Ux lo r 1'· , 2 7 U . 2 d 1 8 8 , 4 9 3 P . 2 d l 2 8 3 ( 1 9 7 2 ) .

fhe Utah S upreme Coul·t ,·n Lund v. Phillips
_ Petroleum
Co_c.• F! L..Zrl 276, 351 P.Zd 952 (1960), at p. 954 stated:
"To be sustainable in lav1 the verdict need only
fall within the orbit so that it can be said that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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there is substnatial evidence from which reason bl
minds could believe the facts."
a e
A general proposition regard1"ng

th e su ff"1c1ency
·
and

weight of evidence is stated at 30 Am Jur 2d , Evidence,
p.
226.

§ 1080,

" ... evidence i~ sufficient or satisfactory if it is
such as to satisfy an unprejudice mind of the truth."
After reviewing the transcript in question, it is
evident that there is sufficient evidence to support the Trial
Court's findings and Judgment in favor of Respondents, against
the Appellants in this case.
POINT II
THE RESPONDENTS,

or~

A TRIAL OF THE ISSUES, PROVED THE

ELEMENTS OF STATUTORY FRAUD AGAINST THE APPELLANTS.
The Utah Uniform Securities Act, Utah Code Annotated
§ 61-1-22 (l)(b) states:

"any person who
(b) offers or sells a security by means of any
untrue statement of a material fact or any omission
to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading
(the buyer not knowing of the untruth or omission),
and who does not sustain the burden of proof that
he did not know,and inthe exercise of reasonable care
could not have been known, of the untruth or omission,
is liable to the person buying the security from him,
who may sue either at law or in equity to recover the
consideration paid for the security, together with
interest at six percent per year from the date of
payment, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees~ less
the amount of any income received on the secur1!Y•
upon the tender of the security or for damages if
he no longer owns the security. Damages are the
amount that would be recoverable upon a tender less
the value of the security when the buyer disposed
of it and interest at six percent per year from the
date of disposition.
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(2) Every_person who directly or indirectly controls
a s~ller liab~e under subsection (1), every partner,
office~, or d~r~ctor of such a seller, every person
occupying a similar status or performing similar
functions, every employer of such a seller who materially aids in the sale, and every broker-dealer or
~g~nt who materially aids in the sale are also liable
Jointly and severally with and to the same extent as
the seller, unless the nonseller who is so liable
sustains the burden of proof that he did not know
andin exercise of reasonable care could not have '
known, of the existence of the facts by reason of which
the liability is alleged to exist. There is contribution as in cases of contract among the several
persons so liable."
Section 61-1-13 (lO)(a) states:
"The words, 'sale', or 'sell' include every contract
of sale of, contract to sell, or disposition of, a
security or interest in a security for value."
Section 61-1-13 (lO)(f) states:
"The terms defined in this subsection do not include
(i) any bona fide pledge or loan ... " (emphasis added).
In reviewing the transcript in question, it does
I

qppear that the stocks which were deposited in escrow with
Ajvin l. Smith were placed in escrow as a pledge for the note.
~owever,

an option was also granted to purchase stock as addit-

ional consideration (Exhibit "4", T.36).
uti]izes the qualifying language of

bon~

Also, the statute
fide pledge or loan

and the Utah Supreme Court in Guarantee Mortgage Co. v. Flint,
66 U.128, 240 P. 175 (1925), at p. 136 adopts the language of
37 Am Jur 2d Fraud and Deceit, Section 12 at page 33 which
states:
"The 1a 1~ re qui res good fa i th i n ever~ bus i ~es s
transaction, and does not allow one ~ntentionally to
deceive another by false representatio~s or.concealments and if he does so, it will require him to
make good such representations .... "
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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And the transcript herein clearly indicates that good
faith was not involved in the transaction with the Respondent
as shown by the representations made by Appellant, M.D. Haltom
(T.18, 21, 22, 23 and 24) and the fact that the Appellant,
Michael S. Tanner mortgaged the home prior to moving into the
same and tendered the money to a corporation controlled by his
father,

(T. 173) after having made statements that the home

would have to be transferred without a mortgage (T.166).
The Fedea rl Court, in Securities & Exchange Commission
v. Guild Films Co., S.D.

N.Y. 178 F. Supp 418 (1959), in attempt·

ing to determine bona fide or good faith, at p. 423 stated:
"The touchstone to the transaction is the good faith
of the parties. A good faith consisting not of an
absence of intent to evade the statute, but an
absence of intent on the part of the one delivering
the proprty that it be sold and an absence of intent
on the part of the one receiving it at the time he
receives the property to sell it."
An option was granted for the sale of certain securit·
ies and certain securities were pledged as security for the note,
the pledged securities could be sold in the event of a default on
the note and in the present case, a default did occur.

The Utah

Supreme Court in Combined Metals Reduction Co., et al. v. State
Tax Commission, 111

u. 156,

176 P.2d 614 (1947) at page 616

adopted Webster's New International Dictionary definition of
bona fide as:
"being in or with good faith; without fraud or deceit .. ·
and as shown by the sections of the transcript quoted above,
Appellants clearly indicated an ab Se n c e of good fa i th i n their
The Utah Supreme Court in
transactions
with
Respondents.
Sponsored by the S.J.
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-10Supply Company v. Hunter, 527 P.2d 217 (1974) in reference to
Utah Code Annotated, 61-1-22 at pp. 220,221 stated,
"That its objective was to moderate the requirements
of common law fraud and the difficulties involved
in its proof, by imposing a higher standard of ethics
and ~esponsibility upon the sellers of securities and
p~ac1ng upon them the affirmative duty of making full
disclosure of all material facts; and a concomitantly
it is intended to reduce the buyer's burden of inves-'
tigation and inquriy, and make it easier for him to
obtain redress on the basis of deception. Under which
provisions, a buyer need only show by a preponderance
of the evidence that in making the sale, the Seller
made an untrue statement or omission concerning the
material fact and that the buyer did not know the
untruth or omission. And, an aspect of this statute
important to note, is that when the buyer has done
so, the statute does change the burden of proof by
expressly requiring the seller to show that he ...
did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known, of the untruth or omission."
The Appellant, M.D. Haltom, indicated that he had
first hand knowledge of the representations made to Respondent
(T.82 and 83) and the Appellant, Michael S. Tanner, having full
knowledge of the prior transactions borrowed against the equity
in the real property by the mortgage executed on February 20,
1969 and transferred proceeds of the loan to a corporation
controlled by his father,

Co-Defendant, Stan Tanner (T.172

and 173).
Louis Loss on Securities Regulation, Volume I 2d
Edition (1961 ), when referring to exempted transactions commencing page 645, makes a distinction that the pledge or sale must
be bona fide and as clearly shown by the transcript in this case,
the pledge and the option were not bona fide pledges for the
security of the note.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Porrn

III

THE RESPONDENTS SUSTAINED THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF JN
REGARD TO COMMON LAW FRAUD.
The Court, in Pace v. Parish, 122 U.141, 247 P.2d
273 (1952) established the following requisites for common law
fraud and taking the evidence in a light favorable to Respondent,
it is clearly demonstrated that they have been proved in the
instant case.

1.

That a representation was made: M.D.Haltom made

representations to the Respondent regarding the viability of
certain stock (T.18, 21, 22, 23 and 24) and Appellant, Michael
S. Tanner represented that the home in question must not have
a mortgage (T.166).
2.

Concerning a presently existing material fact:

M.D. Haltom made such representations (T.18, 21, 22, 23 and 24)
and Michael Tanner indicated the home could not have a mortgage
or lien.

However, Michael Tanner mortgaged the home before mov-

ing into the same. (T.166, 172 and 173).
3.

l~hich were false:

The representations made by M.

D. Haltom were false as shown in that the buffalo deal fell
through (T.207), no merger took place (T.215); that there was
a dispute with Jiffy John (T.190) regarding Michael S. Tanner,
the fact that he mortgaged the property after having indicated
that one of the conditions was that he receive the property
free and clear (T.166, 172 and 173).
4.

Which the r~re sen tor _e it h er___itl_kll~-tQ_jl_~~·
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-12or (b} made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge
~on

which to base said representations:

M.D.Haltom represented

he had first hand knowledge regarding the transaction in question
(T.82 and 83) and Michael S. Tanner represented that the home
was to be transferred without a lien but prior to moving into
the home, executed a mortgage and diverted the proceeds to
Ji;!ni,fer Day, Inc., a company owned by his father and stepmother (T.162, 166 and 173).
5.
act upon it:

For the purpose of inducing the other party to
Respondents did in fact act upon the representat-

ions of Appellants (T.53).
6.

That the other party, acting reasonabley and

in ignorance of its faslity:

Respondents' actions were reason-

ably based on the represeniation of M.D.Haltom (T.l~, ~l, 22,
23 a'nd 24) .
7.

Did in fact rely upon it:

In this instance,

Respondents did rely upon the representations (T.53) and were
thereby induced to act (T.53).
8.

To his injury and damage:

Respondents conveyed

their real property (T.44) and received no compensation other
than $711.25 as an interest payment received from Michael S.
Tanner (T.58).
The Utah Supreme Court in In Re Madsen's Estate,
123 U.327, 259 P.2d 595 (1953) at p. 605 in defining fraud
stated:
"Fraud is defined to be any act, omission, or concealment which involves a breach of legal duty, trust, or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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confiden~e justly reposed, and injurious to another
or by which an undue and unconscious advantage is '
taken of another; a_r~d-o_lj_121ay___k collected and inferred
from the nature and c1 rcumstances of the tran-sa.-c~
(emphasis add~--· - - - __l_!Ul_.
In the case presently before the Court, it is clear
from the transcript that both Appellants were involved in obtaining the Respondents'

property without a mortgage and Respondents

have been injured as a result thereof.
In regard to M.D.

Haltom's liability,

Fraud and Deceit, Section 320, at p.

37 Am Jur 2d,

423 states:

"An agent is personally liable for damage caused to
third persons by his fraud or false representations,
even though he is acting in behalf of his employer,
and even though he receives no benefit from the
transaction."
Also, in regard to the fraud of Michael
Am Jur 2d Fraud and Deceit, Section 33, p.

S. Tanner, 37

59 states:

" ... the rule is firmly established and followed in
the great majority of jurisdictions that it is an
act of fraud to purchase or obtain good_~ or services
with a preconceived intent not to pay for them."
(emphasis added)
And in the case presently before the Court, the evidence is
uncontested that the Appellant, Michael

S. Tanner, requested

that the home in question be acquired without a lien, but prior
to moving into said home, executed a mortgage (T. 166 and 172,
Exhibit "17").
The case of ~~~l _v~ _[3jll2_, 13 U.Zd 83, 363 P.2d
1
11 ans
t
597 (1962) relied upon by the Appe

i n t ha t

s a ; d c a s e co nc l ude d t ha t

t he

can be distinguished

i nd i vi d ua l

P a r t i e s vie re

merely pursuing their own course of action without any desire
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or intention of causing harm to another or to cause another
party to breach his contract and the Court, therefore, held
that liability would not be found in such an incident.

However,

in the case presently before the Court, the testimony as
indicated above shows a systematic scheme to deprive the
Respondents of the proeprty in question without a mortgage and
overt action by the Appellants toward this end.
The Utah Supreme Court in Ellis v. Hale,

13 U.2d

27, 373 P.2d 382 (1962) at p. 385 adopts the Restatement of
Torts Section 533 in holding that:
"If a person fraudulently makes a misrepresentation
of facts to another with the intention that it will
be transmitted to a third person, the latter may have
a cause of action against the misrepresenter."
Michael S. Tanner clearly represented that the home
in question was to be without a mortgage (T.166).

However, as

shown by his own action, this was clearly not his intention
(T.173) and the Restatement of Torts Second Edition Section
503 states:
"(l)(a) representation of the makers own intentio~ to
do or not to do a particular thing is fraudulent 1f
he does not have the intention."
And as shown with Michael Tanner, he clearly did not have the
intention of not having a mortgage placed upon the home because
a mortgage was placed upon the home prior to Mr. Tanner's
moving into the same. (T.173).

The Utah Supreme Court in

Elder v. Clawson, 14 U.2d 379, 384 P.2d 802 (1963) held that
fraud may be committed by suppression of the truth and silence,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- l 5and that a falsehood or suggest1·on o f f a l se h ood is not necessary.
The Appellants have rn?rle much of the fact that
Respondents should have known that the statements made were

mis-

re presentations and that Respondents had nn independent duty to
investigate said representations.

However,

the Restatement of

Torts, Second Edition, Section 540 states:
"The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation of
fact is justified in relying upon its truth, although
he might.have ascertained the falsity of the representation had he made an investigation.·'
Williston on Contracts, Third Edition, Volume 12,
Section 1512 at at p.

427 states:

"Although many decisions require that a Plaintiff
should not have been too foolish in believing what
no reasonable man in his position should believe, it
is going too far, both in reason and on the authorities, to say that a plaintiff, unless his conduct was
not wholly irrational, should lose his rights
because he failed to make independent investigation
and believed what he 1'ias told.
It should not lie
in the mouth of a man who induced his reliance
to assert that the reliance 1'/as negligent.
A defendant, who misrepresents the facts and induces
the plaintiff to rely on his statements should not be
heard in an equitable action to assert that the
reliance was neglir:ient unless Plaintiff's conduct.
in the light of his intelligence and information is
preposterous or irrat.ional."
This section \'las quoted 1'iith approval

in ~~e---_e_t_(ll_._1.1_,~ai:i.~·

Supra and the Utah Supreme Court in [Jenzer v.
Cleaners,

Inc.,

543 P.2d 898 (1976) at p.

adopted the above general

Con_ti_nenta_l_l2.!:Y

900 seems to have

propositions in stating:

"The law does not c1enerally approve or r;ive advantage
to one who intentionally deceives another, obstructs
him from learning the facts, and then attempts to
impute fault and resµonsibility to the other party
for believing him."
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-16Respondents utilized reasonable care in attempting an independent verification of Appellants' statements (T.65 and 67) and
were justified in relying upon Appellants' statements.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court was correct in entering Judgment
against the Appellants, M.D. Haltom and Michael S. Tanner, and
based upon the foregoing arguments and authorities, said
Judgment should be affirmed and Respondents should be awarded
their costs of this appeal.
DATED this lst day of September, 1977.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

~cf~

Alvin I. Smith
Attorney for Respondents
1305 J.C. Penney Building
310 South Main Street
Salt Lake City.Utah 84101
Telephone: 322-0524
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